Hehr v. City of McCall Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 39535 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-25-2012
Hehr v. City of McCall Appellant's Brief Dckt.
39535
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"Hehr v. City of McCall Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39535" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 1443.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/1443
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants/Cross Respondents, 
vs. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 39535-2012 
District Court No. CV-2010-276C 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Victor S. Villegas 
Jed W. Manwaring 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box 959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ Appellants 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
RICHARD HEHR and GREYSTONE 
VILLAGE, LLC, 
Plaintiffs/ Appellants/Cross Respondents, 
vs. 
CITY OF McCALL, 
Defendant/Respondent/Cross Appellant. 
Supreme Court No. 39535-2012 
District Court No. CV-2010-276C 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
Victor S. Villegas 
Jed W. Manwaring 
EVANS KEANE LLP 
1405 W. Main Street 
P.O. Box959 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0959 
Telephone: (208) 384-1800 
Facsimile: (208) 345-3514 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Christopher H. Meyer 
Martin C. Hendrickson 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
P.O. Box 2720 
Boise, ID 83701-2720 
Telephone: (208) 388-1200 
Facsimile: (208) 388-1300 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................................... 1 
(i) Nature of the Case: ........................................................................................................... 1 
(ii) Course of Proceedings: ..................................................................................................... 1 
(iii) Statement of Facts: ........................................................................................................... 3 
ISSUED PRESENTED ON APPEAL ......................................................................................... 9 
A. Did the district court err in disposing of all of Greystone's takings claims on 
summary judgment? ......................................................................................................... 9 
B. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's inverse condemnation claims 
were barred under the four year statute of limitations? ............................................... 9 
C. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's conveyance of nine building 
lots to McCall was voluntary as a matter of law? .......................................................... 9 
D. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies? ................................................................................................. 9 
E. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claim based on the U.S. 
Constitution was not ripe and/or was barred under the two year statute of 
limitations? ........................................................................................................................ 9 
F. When is the deadline to file notice of a tort claim triggered under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act when a city passes a resolution creating a right to a refund of fees? ....... 9 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 9 
I. Standard of Review ........................................................................................................... 9 
II. Did the district court err in disposing of all of Greystone's takings claims on 
summary judgment? ....................................................................................................... 10 
III. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claims were barred 
under the four year statute of limitations? ................................................................... 14 
A. Accrual on Greystone's first taking claim did not begin until Greystone deeded 
the lots to the City ....................................................................................................... 15 
B. Accrual on Greystone's second taking claim did not begin until Greystone 
constructed the roadway and utility improvements ................................................ 17 
C. Alternatively, this Court should depart from the McCuskey standard on the same 
policy grounds set forth in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4 for accrual 
of an inverse condemnation claim ............................................................................. 17 
IV. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's conveyance of nine building 
lots to McCall was voluntary as a matter of law? ........................................................ 20 
V. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies? ......................................................................................................................... 26 
VI. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claim based on the U.S. 
Constitution was not ripe and/or was barred under the two year statute of 
limitations? ...................................................................................................................... 27 
A. Greystone was not required to bring its inverse condemnation claim or other 
Federal claims under Section 1983 and is not barred by the two year statute of 
limitations for section 1983 claims ............................................................................. 28 
B. This case is distinguishable from Williamson County and the ripeness test is 
inapplicable .................................................................................................................. 29 
VII. When is the deadline to file notice of a tort claim triggered under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act when a city passes a resolution creating a right to a refund of fees? ..... 31 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 32 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
American Falls Reservoir Dist. No.2 v. Idaho Dept. ofWater Resources, 143 Idaho 862,870-73, 
154 P.3d 433, 441-43 (2007) .................................................................................................... 29 
Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 906, 854 P.2d 242, 249 (1993) .................................................. 28 
Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (1987) ................... 11 
BHA Investments v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315,319 (2004) ..................... 13 
BHAinvestments,Inc. v. CityofBoise, 141 Idaho 168,172, 108P.3d315,319(2004) ............. 12 
BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 175, 108 P.3d 315,322 (2004) ............. 31 
Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003) ................................................................ 12 
C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho 140,75 P.3d 194 (2003) .................... 19 
City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 846, 136 P.3d 310, 317 (2006) ..................... 17 
Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P .2d 993 (1986) ................................................................... 10 
Covington v. Jefferson County, 137 Idaho 777,53 P.3d 828 (2002) ............................................ 17 
Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 3 75, 382 (9th Cir. 2002) ...................................... 32 
Driver v. Sf Corp., 139 Idaho 423,427, 80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003) ............................................ 10 
Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-897, 155 P.3d 695, 697- 698 (2007) ............................... 22 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal. 482 U.S. 
304, 314-315, (1987) ................................................................................................................. 30 
Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 n. 28 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................. 32 
KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003) ................................. 17 
KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003) ......................................... 22, 27 
Magnus en Prop. P 'ship v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 13 8 Idaho 166, 169, 59 P .3d 971, 97 4 (2002) 
··················································································································································· 34 
McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho 213,912 P.2d 100 (1996) ............................................ 15 
McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho at 217,912 P.2d at 104 ................................................ 16 
McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 216, 912 P.2d at 103 .............................................................................. 16 
MK Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 3 50, 612 P .2d 1192, 1197 (1980) ....................... 11 
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138,983 P.2d 208 (1999) .................. 9 
Nollan v. Cal Coastal Cornrn'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) .................................................................. 24 
Regan v. Kootenai County, 140 Idaho 721, 725, 100 P.3d 615, 619 (2004) ................................ 28 
State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365,377, 399 P.2d 955, 962 (1965) ....................................................... 21 
Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671,603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) ............................. 15 
Tibbs v. Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979) ........................................................... 15 
White v. Bannock County Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003) .......................... 29 
Williamson County Reg 'l Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985) ........................................................................................................................................ 17 
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 
172 (1985) ........................................................................................................................... 30,31 
Willie v. Board a/Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133,59 P.3d 302,305 (2002) .............................. 9, 22 
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) ............................................................................. 33 
11 
Statutes 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ..................................................................................................................... 30, 31 
I.C. § 50-219 ................................................................................................................................. 34 
I. C. § 5-224 ................................................................................................................................... 15 
I.C. § 67-6511A ............................................................................................................................ 18 
I.C. § 6-906 ................................................................................................................................... 34 
I. C. § 6-907 ................................................................................................................................... 34 
I. C. § 6-908 ................................................................................................................................... 34 
Rules 
I.R.C.P. 56( c) ............................................................................................................................ 9, 22 
I.R.C.P. 56(e) ................................................................................................................................ 10 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1) .............................................................................................................................. 11 
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l), (e)(2), (f) ............................................................................................................ 10 
111 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) Nature of the Case: 
This is a land use case involving the payment of "community housing" fees to the City of 
McCall ("McCall" or the "City"). Appellants Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC 
(collectively "Greystone") were required to pay a community housing fee to the City as a 
condition of approval of their development to construct a Planned Unit Development ("PUD") 
and subdivision called Greystone Village in McCall. Greystone paid the City's community 
housing fee by deeding ownership of nine lots worth a cumulative value of $1,170,000, 
consisting of Phase III of Greystone Village, to the City. Moreover, the City required Greystone 
to construct certain improvements to serve the lots, namely roads and utilities, after Greystone no 
longer owned the lots. The City's "community housing" fee was determined illegal and 
unconstitutional in a separate lawsuit that the City did not appeal. Greystone filed this lawsuit 
seeking reimbursement for the value of the lots deeded to McCall and the costs of constructing 
improvements to those lots. The district court dismissed Greystone's Complaint on McCall's 
motion for summary judgment, which Greystone now appeals. 
(ii) Course of Proceedings: 
Greystone filed its Complaint and First Amended Complaint on July 15, 2010 and July 
16, 2010, respectively. R. Vol. I, pp. 1, 6. Greystone' s Complaint alleges several different legal 
theories against McCall for reimbursement of the value of nine lots Greystone deeded to McCall 
pursuant to McCall's illegal community housing fee and for reimbursement of the costs to 
construct improvements to serve the nine lots. R. Vol. I, p. 6. 
McCall answered Greystone' s Complaint on August 31, 201 0, and filed a counterclaim 
for breach of contract. R. Vol. I, p. 11. After very limited discovery, the City filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment on April 5, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 143. In its motion, the City argued that 
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Greystone's claim for reimbursement for the value of nine building lots conveyed to McCall was 
barred under the Tort Claims Act, applicable statutes of limitation, failure to exhaust, ripeness, 
and that Greystone voluntarily paid the community housing fees. R. Vol. I, p. 146. Greystone 
filed its Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment, along with supporting affidavits, on April 
27, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 250. Greystone opposed Valley County's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on grounds that its Complaint was timely filed and supported its contention that the 
community housing fee was a required fee through multiple affidavits filed with its opposing 
memorandum. 
The district court issued its Memorandum Decision on the City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on June 16, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 361. The district court granted the City's motion 
finding that the state law claims were barred under the Tort Claims Act, the statute of limitations 
for a takings claim had expired, and Greystone's conveyance of building lots to the City was 
voluntary. !d. The district court also detennined that Greystone's federal law claims were 
untimely and/or unripe. !d. 
After the district court issued its Memorandum Decision, McCall submitted a proposed 
judgment. Greystone filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Objection to Proposed Judgment 
on June 29, 2011. R. Vol. II, p. 373. Greystone's motion was based on the fact that the Court 
did not fully dispose of all of Greystone's takings claims, namely Greystone's claim that the 
City's requirement that it build roads and construct utility improvements to the nine lots that the 
City now owned constituted a taking of Greystone's money. !d. Greystone additionally moved 
the district court to reconsider its ruling that, as a matter of law, Greystone's conveyance of the 
nine lots to McCall was voluntarily because the record contained numerous and genuine issues of 
material fact regarding the question of voluntariness. !d. 
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Thereafter the City filed a motion seeking an award of attorney fees, which Greystone 
opposed. R. Vol. III, pp. 478, 598. The district court issued a second Memorandum Decision on 
October 18, 2011, denying Greystone' s Motion for Reconsideration and denying the City's 
motion for an award of costs and fees. R. Vol. IV, p. 630. In denying Greystone's Motion for 
Reconsideration, the district court determined that Greystone's second claim based on McCall's 
requirement that Greystone incur the costs of building roads and infrastructure to support the 
nine lots conveyed to the City was encompassed by and was part of Greystone's first claim for 
reimbursement for the value of the nine lots conveyed to the City. !d. 
The district court further determined that Greystone's conveyance of building lots must 
have been voluntary because McCall had not enacted an ordinance regarding community housing 
until after conveyance of the nine lots. !d. The Court did not address the affidavits or additional 
evidence submitted by Greystone regarding the question of whether the conveyance was 
voluntary. The district court rejected McCall's request for an award of attorney fees because 
Greystone' s pursuit of the claim was not frivolous considering the complex legal issues at play 
and there were no grounds to state that Greystone pursued the case without a reasonable basis in 
fact or in law. Id. 
The district court entered a judgment on November 22, 2011, dismissing Greystone's 
Complaint with prejudice and issuing a Rule 54(b) Certificate. R. Vol. IV, p. 638. Greystone 
timely filed this appeal and McCall filed a cross-appeal. 
(iii) Statement of Facts: 
Community housing is also known as affordable or workforce housing. Community 
housing is not low income housing. The purpose of community housing is to provide for 
housing that is affordable to the local workforce by allocating a certain number of residences to 
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be affordable to persons earning a median income that would be considered low to moderate 
income. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 306. 
McCall perceived that affordable housing was an issue for its local workforce and that 
people working in McCall could not afford to live in McCall. R. Vol. II, p. 301. ~ 4, Ex. B. The 
City participated in a study on community housing needs in McCall and the surrounding area. 
!d. The study, completed in July 2005, found a significant need for affordable workforce 
housing in and around McCall. !d. As a result, McCall passed Resolution 05-19 on September 
22, 2005. R. Vol. II, p. 306. Resolution 05-19 includes a community housing policy and 
requires the City to implement a program to meet affordable housing needs to benefit low and 
moderate income families, local workers, and others with jobs in the City, and directs City staff 
to develop inclusionary zoning ordinances to implement this community housing policy. !d. 
Pursuant to Resolution 05-19, the City enacted two inclusionary zoning ordinances, 
Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820, on February 22, 2006. See Groenevelt Affidavit, Exs. F, G, U. 
Ordinance No. 819 requires all applicants for new subdivisions to submit an inclusionary 
housing plan providing that at least twenty percent (20%) of the lots and houses in the new 
subdivision be permanently deed restricted as affordable community housing. Groenevelt 
Affidavit, Exs. F, U. Ordinance No. 820, on the other hand, requires that all applicants for a 
building permit first pay a community housing fee for each residential unit in order to get the 
permit. Groenevelt Affidavit, Exs. G, U. The community housing fee paid as part of the 
building permit application is to be proportional to the demand for community housing created 
by that new dwelling by providing for affordable housing to low to moderate income workers 
needed to maintain and service the new dwelling. !d. The fee represents the subsidy amount 
necessary to construct affordable housing for these workers. !d. In short, Ordinance No. 819 
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requires developers to provide for new community housing and Ordinance No. 820 requires 
developers to pay a fee to be used to provide community housing. 
Even prior to the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820, the City followed a policy 
requiring developers to address community housing in their application. A sitting member ofthe 
City Council acknowledges that prior to Resolution 05-19 and enactment of Ordinance Nos. 819 
and 820, the City required developers to provide for community housing as part of all new 
development in the City. R. Vol. II, pp. 218-19, 1[1[2-4. Providing for workforce housing as part 
of an application for development was obligated, it was not voluntary, and City staff were 
instructed to exact community housing fees from developers as a condition to approval. Id. In 
fact, based on McCall's land use approval matrix and the point system under that matrix, a 
developer would not have sufficient points for approval without providing for workforce housing 
as part of the application. !d. 
Greystone experienced this at the time it filed its application. Greystone first filed is 
application for a subdivision and PUD on January 12, 2005. Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt, 
Ex. A; 1 R. Vol. II, p. 302, 1[5. This was during the time the City was studying its concerns about 
the availability of housing for the City's workforce, but before Resolution 05-19 and Ordinance 
Nos. 819 and 820. R. Vol. II, pp. 218-19; R. Vol. II, p. 301, 1[ 5. Therefore, Greystone's 
application for a PUD did not address or include any provisions for workforce housing. 
Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. A; R. Vol. II, p. 302, 1[5. The fact that Greystone's application did not 
address workforce housing notwithstanding, beginning with some of its initial meetings with the 
City, planners began to push Greystone on "voluntarily" providing for community or affordable 
housing as part of its development. R. Vol. II, p. 302, 1[1[5-6. It quickly became clear that it was 
not within Greystone' s discretion not to include workforce housing in its development. R. Vol. 
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II, p. 302, ~~5-6; R. Vol. II, p. 226, ~ 7. Further, even though Greystone's PUD application was 
"grandfathered" under Ordinance No. 819, Greystone was still subject to Ordinance No. 820, 
which requires the payment of community housing fees at the time a building permit is applied 
for. See Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. G. 
Greystone obtained final plat approval for its PUD on April 27, 2006 and entered into a 
Development Agreement with McCall. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R. The Development 
Agreement was recorded in Valley County as Instrument No. 308495 on May 4, 2006. !d. 
Article VII, Section 7.2 of the Development Agreement states that: "[t]he appraised market value 
of the lots shall provide Greystone Village with an offset against community housing fees for the 
Greystone Village project. The applicant will also receive the associated benefits of the 
community housing contribution in the building permit application process." Groenevelt 
Affidavit, Ex. R. Greystone's conveyance of the nine lots to McCall was to offset the 
community housing fee required under Ordinance No. 820. As a result, Greystone conveyed the 
nine building lots on July 31, 2006, which consisted of all of Phase III of Greystone Village, to 
McCall in order to satisfy the community housing obligation under Ordinance No. 820. 
Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. S; R. Vol. II, p. 226, ~~ 3-4. On the date of conveyance, the lots had a 
total value of $1,170,000.00 million dollars. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. M. 
After deeding the nine lots to McCall, the City then required Greystone to construct the 
roads and utilities servicing the nine community housing lots even though Greystone no longer 
owned the lots. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R; R. Vol. II, p. 382, ~ 3, Ex. B. Greystone 
questioned the City about this requirement because the Development Agreement did not include 
any requirement or obligation that Greystone also incur the costs of constructing roads and utility 
1 The Affidavit of Michelle Groenevelt was sent to the Clerk of the Idaho Supreme Court as an exhibit to the Clerk's 
Record and will be subsequently referred to as the "Groenevelt Affidavit." 
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improvements to the nine lots. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R. In a July 26, 2007, e-mail message 
to Roger Millar, McCall's former Deputy City Manager, the City's Community Development 
Director, Michelle Groenevelt, questioned Millar about where, in writing, had the City required 
Greystone to construct roads and utilities to the nine lots because the development agreement 
only addressed conveyance of the nine lots. R. Vol. II, p. 385. 
Millar responded by stating that Greystone was required to construct the roads and 
utilities simply because: "[p )art of subdivision is providing the infrastructure to the lots being 
created. The engineering plans reflect this. It was theirs to do when they planned on selling the 
lots and still theirs to do with the donation." Jd. Millar went on to state that Greystone's so 
called donation " ... was good for up to the appraised value on community housing fees only. 
They still have to compete for EDU." ld. The City then required Greystone to incur the costs of 
constructing roadways and utility improvements to serve the nine lots. 
After the City passed Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 and Greystone had entered into a 
Development Agreement with McCall, the Mountain Central Board of Realtors, Inc. sued the 
City, Case No. CV 2006-490-C, in September 2006. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U. The 
Mountain Central lawsuit alleged that McCall's inclusionary zoning ordinances were 
unconstitutional and violated Idaho law. ld. Pending this litigation, the City placed a 
moratorium on new applications. Nonetheless, the City continued its same practice carried on 
before enactment of the inclusionary zoning ordinances to exact community housing payments. 
This is reflected in an October 19, 2006, memorandum from McCall's chief planner to 
Staff, the Chief Planner instructs City personnel on how to address "voluntary" community 
housing mitigation with applicants. R. Vol. II, p. 382, ~ 2, Ex. A; see also R. Vol. III, p. 442. 
This memorandum states that applicants have an option to move forward with their projects on 
the condition that the applicants "offer a form of affordable housing mitigation that is in keeping 
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with the spirit and intent of the housing policy and ordinances that has [sic] been adopted by the 
City." !d. 
The Chief Planner's memorandum to City Staff curiously refers to any offer to mitigate 
for affordable housing as a "voluntary" offer. !d. The memorandum unambiguously states, 
however, that an applicant's obligation to provide for workforce housing was anything but 
voluntary. The Chief Planner's memorandum states that if the applicant proposes "a means of 
compensation as mitigation that is clearly insufficient, we should just return the permit to them 
with a comment that in our judgment the form of consideration does not resolve the affect the 
construction of the residence will have on the City's affordable housing needs." !d. Thus, the 
City continued undaunted by the pending litigation in its ongoing practice of requiring the 
payment of community housing fees under the guise of a "donation." 
After dispositive motions were filed in the Mountain Central litigation, the district court 
issued a Memorandum Decision on February 19, 2008. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. U. The 
decision determined that Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 were an illegal tax, not a valid police 
power regulation, and that the City forced developers to subsidize affordable housing through the 
payment of fees. !d. As a result, the court held, the Ordinances exceeded McCall's legislative 
authority to charge a tax and they were illegal and unconstitutional. !d. After this ruling, McCall 
repealed Ordinance Nos. 819 and 820 on April 24, 2008. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. V. The City 
then passed Resolution 08-11 on April 24, 2008, to refund one hundred percent (100%) of the 
community housing fees paid pursuant to Ordinance No. 820. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. W. The 
City then passed Resolution 09-10 on November 4, 2009, to take effect on December 31, 2009, 
to eliminate the payment of refunds. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. X. 
Pursuant to McCall's Resolution Nos. 08-11 and 09-10, Greystone submitted a refund 
request on the City's Refund Request Form on November 11,2009, identifying the amounts paid 
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to the city for community housing fees. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. Y. The City refused to refund 
Greystone the value of the lots conveyed on grounds that Greystone offered to voluntarily deed 
the lots to McCall. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. X. Greystone then initiated this litigation. 
ISSUED PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in disposing of all of Greystone's takings claims on 
summary judgment? 
B. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's inverse condemnation claims 
were barred under the four year statute of limitations? 
C. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's conveyance of nine building 
lots to McCall was voluntary as a matter of law? 
D. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone failed to exhaust its 
administrative remedies? 
E. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claim based on the U.S. 
Constitution was not ripe and/or was barred under the two year statute of 
limitations? 
F. When is the deadline to file notice of a tort claim triggered under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act when a city passes a resolution creating a right to a refund of fees? 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review. 
This Court employs the same standard as the district court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Pedersen, 133 Idaho 135, 138, 983 P.2d 
208 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate only when all of the evidence establishes that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56( c); Willie v. Board a/Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302,305 
(2002). The Court should liberally construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party. !d. The non-moving party must set forth genuine issues of material fact 
by affidavit or otherwise. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Regarding constitutional claims or the interpretation 
and application of a legislative act, this Court independently determines whether the facts 
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support a violation. Willie at 133, 59 P.3d at 305; Driver v. Sf Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 427, 80 
P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003). 
II. Did the district court err in disposing of all of Greystone's takings claims on 
summary judgment? 
Greystone filed its Complaint seeking monetary reimbursement against McCall for: (1) 
the value of the nine lots it was required to deed to pay for community housing fees AND; (2) 
reimbursement for money it spent to pay for construction costs of roadway and utilities 
improvements to those nine lots. The district court incorrectly held that Greystone's claim for 
just compensation for the money it spent to pay for the construction costs of roadway and utility 
improvements was encompassed in, and was a part of, its claim for just compensation for the 
value of the nine lots. 
A complaint need only contain a concise statement of facts constituting the cause of 
action and demand for relief. Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 715 P .2d 993 (1986). The purpose 
of the complaint is to provide notice of the material facts upon which a claim is based. !d.; see 
also I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l), (e)(2), (f). "Under modem pleading rules parties may seek alternative or 
different types of relief regardless of consistency or whether based on legal or equitable grounds 
or both." MK Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345,350,612 P.2d 1192, 1197 (1980); See 
also I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l ). Modem pleading rules merely require a simple and concise statement of 
the operative facts upon which relief may be granted on any sustainable theory and regardless of 
consistency. !d. Several legal theories for recovery may draw upon the same core set facts. See 
Associates Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (1987). 
In Greystone's First Amended Complaint, it set forth certain facts that were common to 
all its claims. R. Vol. I, p. 7. Then, as to Greystone's First Cause of Action for a declaratory 
judgment, it set out in Paragraph 18 that it sought a declaration that the City's requirement that it 
deed lots to pay for community housing fees was illegal. In Paragraph 19 Greystone set out a 
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separate claim for a declaration that the: "utility and roadway improvements that the City 
required Greystone to construct directly benefited the public as a whole, are a revenue raising 
measure, and therefore, constitute an illegal tax." R. Vol. I, pp. 8-9. 
Then, as to Greystone's Second Cause of Action for inverse condemnation, it set out in 
Paragraph 22 of its First Amended Complaint that it sought the payment of just compensation as 
a result of McCall's requirement that it pay community housing fees by forcing it to deed real 
property to the City. In Paragraph 24 Greystone separately set out that: "the imposition of the 
condition that Greystone construct utility improvements and/or other public improvements at its 
own expense was a taking of property without just compensation and in violation of the Idaho 
and Federal Constitutions." R. Vol. I, p. 9. 
Likewise, Greystone's prayer for relief sets out separate, distinct requests for the court to 
grant relief. Greystone's first prayer for relief asks the district court to declare that the City's 
requirement that Greystone deed lots to the City was illegal. Greystone's second prayer for relief 
separately asks the district court to declare: " ... that the monies expended by Greystone Village, 
LLC to construct utilities and public improvements to the deeded lots were for the benefit of the 
public, was illegal and, therefore, Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement or otherwise payment 
of just compensation." R. Vol. I, p. 10. 
These are two separate takings claims. They give rise to separate damages or forms of 
just compensation. Greystone's first inverse condemnation claim is for the value of the nine lots 
deeded to McCall. Greystone's second inverse condemnation claim is for the money spent to 
construct improvements to the nine lots. Money is property in a constitutional sense that cannot 
be taken for a public use without just compensation. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 
216 (2003); BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 
(2004) (the taking of money to pay a fee pursuant to a void and unconstitutional ordinance is a 
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taking of property). Finally, and most importantly, accrual of these separate claims was 
triggered at different times for purposes of calculating the statute of limitations, which is the 
issue addressed immediately below. 
The Court's June 16, 2011, Memorandum Decision indicates that summary judgment is 
granted in full to the City and directed the City to prepare a judgment and Rule 54(b) Certificate. 
The City's Motion for Summary Judgment, however, only addressed Greystone's claim for just 
compensation relative to conveyance of the nine lots. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
was completely silent as to its requirement that Greystone construct roadway improvements and 
make utilities available to each of these nine lots, and Greystone's claim to recover these costs. 
SeeR. Vol. I, p. 6, ~~ 19, 24. 
After conveying the nine lots to the City, the City still required Plaintiffs to shoulder the 
costs of building the roads and providing utilities to these nine lots before the City would 
approve Final Plat for Greystone Village. Appellant Richard Hehr met with City officials to 
question where, in writing, Greystone was required to also construct roads and utilities to the 
nine lots. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 382, ~ 3, Ex. B. The Development Agreement between Greystone 
and the City does not impose any requirement on Greystone to construct these improvements to 
the nine lots after McCall became the owner of the lots. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R. 
In a July 26, 2007, e-mail message to Roger Millar, McCall's former Deputy City 
Manager, the City's Community Development Director, Michelle Groenevelt, questioned Millar 
about where, in writing, had the City required Greystone to construct roads and utilities to the 
nine lots because the development agreement only addressed conveyance of the nine lots. R. 
Vol. II, p. 385. Millar responded by stating that Greystone was required to construct the roads 
and utilities simply because: "[p ]art of subdivision is providing the infrastructure to the lots 
being created. The engineering plans reflect this. It was theirs to do when they planned on 
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selling the lots and still theirs to do with the donation." !d. Millar went on to state that 
Greystone's so called donation" ... was good for up to the appraised value on community housing 
fees only. They still have to compete for EDU." Id. 
Greystone asked the district court to declare that these construction requirements and 
related costs, in addition to and separate from the taking of Greystone' s nine lots, constitute a 
taking without payment of just compensation and an illegal tax against Greystone. See, e.g. BHA 
Investments v. City o.f Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P .3d 315, 319 (2004) (holding that where 
the government has no authority to charge a fee, the fee constitutes an illegal tax subject to the 
takings clause of both the Idaho and federal constitution). It is an adjudicated fact that the City 
had no legal authority to require Greystone to pay anything toward community housing, 
including the building of a roadway and utilities to the nine lots conveyed to the City. The City 
did not address these claims in its Motion for Summary Judgment and the district court did not 
rule on these claims in its June 6, 2011, Memorandum Decision. 
As a result, Greystone moved the district court to reconsider its instructions to the City to 
prepare an order dismissing all of Greystone's claims. In its Second Memorandum Decision 
dated October 18, 2011, the district court rejected Greystone' s Motion to Reconsider on this 
issue by simply stating that that Greystone's inverse condemnation claim to recover the costs of 
construction was encompassed in Greystone's inverse condemnation claim for value of the nine 
lots. R. Vol. IV, p. 634. Greystone's First Amended Complaint provides notice of Greystone's 
separate claims and remedies sought, and satisfies the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure governing 
pleading standards. The district court's decision is in error. 
The separate taking claim for the costs of road and utilities construction to the nine lots 
taken by McCall is properly set out in Greystone's First Amended Complaint. See R. Vol. I, p. 
6, ~~ 19, 24. A claim for reimbursement of the construction costs is distinctly, plainly, and 
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concisely set forth. The plain language of the Complaint provides unambiguous notice of the 
different claims and the different claims for relief. The district court erred in determining that 
Greystone's taking/illegal tax claim to recover the costs of road and utilities construction was 
encompassed by Greystone's taking claim for the nine lots conveyed to McCall. 
III. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claims were barred 
under the four year statute of limitations? 
The district court held that Greystone's inverse condemnation claim regarding the nine 
deeded lots to the City was barred by Idaho's four year statute of limitations. In reaching its 
conclusion, the district court fixed the date of accrual for the running of the statute of limitations 
on the date Greystone signed the Development Agreement providing that Greystone would 
convey nine lots to the City. The district court erred in fixing the date of accrual in this case 
because it misapplied the standard for establishing the date of accrual as set forth by this Court in 
Tibbs v. Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 603 P.2d 1001 (1979) and carried on in McCuskey v. Canyon 
County, 128 Idaho 213, 912 P.2d 100 (1996). 
Additionally, the district court erred in fixing the date of accrual for Greystone's inverse 
condemnation claim dealing with the roadway and utility improvements on the date the 
development agreement was signed. The date of accrual of Greystone's inverse condemnation 
claim for the roadway and utility improvements accrued at a much later date according to the 
Tibbs-McCuskey standard. 
The statute of limitations in Idaho for inverse condemnation is four (4) years. I.C. § 5-
224. Generally, the standard test for determining when an inverse condemnation action accrues 
for purposes of the statute of limitations "is to be fixed at the point in time at which the 
impairment, of such a degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' 
property interest, became apparent." Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 
1001, 1005 (1979); See also McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho at 217, 912 P.2d at 104 
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(taking occurs and the cause of action accrues "as of the time that the full extent of plaintiffs 
loss of use and enjoyment of property becomes apparent."). Damages for inverse condemnation 
are assessed as of the time of the taking. McCuskey v. Canyon County, 128 Idaho at 217, 912 
P.2d at 104. 
In cases like McCuskey, and this one, when the government does not engage in formal 
condemnation proceedings, there is always the question of when the cause of action accrues. 
While the Tibbs standard for designating accrual of the claim is somewhat arbitrary, the standard 
sets forth at least two distinct, but necessary events, for accrual. First, the party seeking damages 
for inverse condemnation must experience a loss of use and enjoyment of property (i.e. 
substantial interference with their property interest). Second, that loss of use and enjoyment 
must be apparent. For example, in McCuskey the loss of use and enjoyment of the claimant's 
property and the apparentness of that loss both occurred at the same time, when a stop work 
order was issued on construction of the claimant's convenience store. McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 
216,912 P.2d at 103. 
A. Accrual on Greystone's first taking claim did not begin until Greystone 
deeded the lots to the City. 
In this case, the City argued below and the district court agreed that at the very latest 
Greystone's claim for inverse condemnation accrued by May 3, 2006, the date Greystone signed 
a Development Agreement with the City. The district court's application of the Tibbs standard to 
the facts ofthis case and accrual ofGreystone's claims is simply wrong. 
Ripeness and justiciability go hand in hand with the notion of a statute of limitations 
accruing. That is, in order for the statute of limitations to run on a claim, the claim must be ripe 
for adjudication. This Court has held that a property owner cannot maintain an inverse 
condemnation action unless there has actually been a taking of his or her property. KMST, LLC 
v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 581, 67 P.3d 56, 60 (2003) (citing Covington v. Jefferson 
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County, 137 Idaho 777, 53 P.3d 828 (2002)) See also Williamson County Reg'! Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (prohibiting pre-takings 
claims). A pending or potential future loss of the property is not sufficient under McCuskey or 
City of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson; actual loss of use and enjoyment of the property is required. 
Here, this Court should answer the question: could Greystone have brought an inverse 
condemnation claim and been paid just compensation at the time it signed the Development 
Agreement? The answer is no. Greystone's inverse condemnation claim was not ripe because 
the City has not taken possession of the nine lots at that time. While it was arguably apparent by 
April 2006 that the City intended to exact nine lots from Greystone, awareness of a potential 
future loss of use and enjoyment of property, alone, is not sufficient under McCuskey. See City 
of Coeur d'Alene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 846, 136 P.3d 310, 317 (2006) (a claim does not 
exist until the landowner complies with the regulation). Greystone did not, and could not have, 
lost the use and enjoyment of those lots at any time before July 31, 2006, when it conveyed title 
of those lots to the City. 
This is further illustrated by the fact that Greystone had no obligation to complete its 
development of Greystone Village at the time it signed the Development Agreement. Greystone 
could have lost its financing, lost interest in pursuing the development or otherwise decided not 
to go forth with the development for a number of other reasons. Conversely, the City could not 
have compelled Greystone to move forward with the development had Greystone decided not to 
proceed nor could the City have compelled Greystone to convey the nine lots had Greystone not 
undertaken the development. The only thing the City could have done was terminate the 
Development Agreement. See I.C. § 67-6511A ( ... A commitment may be terminated, and the 
zoning designation upon which the use is based reversed, upon the failure of the requirements in 
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the commitment after a reasonable time as determined by the governing board or upon the failure 
of the owner. .. ). 
The district court's interpretation of the Tibbs and McCuskey standard would effectively 
allow government to merely express an intent to take property and then wait four years for the 
statute of limitations to run before actually taking the property to avoid paying just 
compensation. Based on the discussions above, Greystone asks this Court to reverse the district 
court's holding that its inverse condemnation claim (regarding the nine lots) began when it 
signed the Development Agreement. 
B. Accrual on Greystone's second taking claim did not begin until Greystone 
constructed the roadway and utility improvements. 
The roadway and utility improvements that the City required Greystone to construct, as 
set forth above, constitutes a separate takings claim from the nine lots deeded to the City. The 
date of accrual for Greystone's second takings claim is different from the first. As discussed 
above, the record on appeal demonstrates that neither party contemplated that Greystone would 
construct the roadway and utility improvements to the nine lots once ownership was transferred 
to the City. Since these costs were not contemplated or discussed by the parties at the time the 
Development Agreement was entered into, it would have been impossible for it to become 
"apparent" to Greystone that it would lose the loss and enjoyment of its property (i.e. money 
spent to pay for the costs of construction) at the time the Development Agreement was executed. 
Therefore, the issue ofwhen Greystone's roadway and utility claim accrued must be remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings to determine the date of accrual. 
C. Alternatively, this Court should depart from the McCuskey standard on the 
same policy grounds set forth in C&G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No. 4 
for accrual of an inverse condemnation claim. 
Alternatively, if this Court affirms the district court's ruling that a party need merely be 
"aware" that a taking of their property is imminent, Greystone asks this Court to depart from that 
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standard for public policy reasons. The policy basis and reasoning set forth in C&G, Inc. v. 
Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003), for a departure from the 
Tibbs standard also establishes that no taking occurred in this case on Greystone's first takings 
claim, and thus Greystone' s inverse condemnation claim accrued at the time it deeded the nine 
lots to the City? 
In C&G the Canyon Highway District rebuilt the Old Middleton Road over C&G's 
property. Jd. at 141, 75 P.3d at 195. The Highway District discussed with C&G the possibility 
of rebuilding the existing winding road over the straight section line that dissected C&G's 
property for a number of years. Jd. The Highway District believed it owned an easement over 
the section line and could rebuild the road without compensating C&G for taking the property on 
which the road would be built. Jd. The Highway District eventually rebuilt the road over the 
section line and advised C&G that due to its alleged easement, C&G was not entitled to 
compensation for a taking of its property. Jd. C&G believed the Highway District's 
representations without further inquiry. Jd. 
By November 1992 the Highway District completed construction of the road's sub base 
and construction was totally finished by November 1993. Jd. at 142, 75 P.3d at 196. In January 
1997, when C&G hired a surveyor for development purposes, it learned for the first time there 
was no easement over the section line. Jd. C&G initiated an inverse condemnation action 
against the Highway District on January 31, 1997. I d. C&G prevailed before the district court 
and the Highway District appealed on grounds that the statute of limitations ran before C&G 
initiated its lawsuit. Jd. 
2 As to Greystone's second inverse condemnation claim for the costs of constructing improvements to the nine lots 
accrual was within four years of filing the Complaint. At the earliest, Greystone did not become aware of the City's 
requirement to construct these improvements until the July 26,2007, e-mail exchange. R. Vol. II, p. 385. 
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On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court declined to apply the McCuskey standard on the 
Issue of accrual and instead applied the "project completion rule," largely on policy 
considerations. !d. at 144, 75 P.3d at 198. The policy considerations identified by the Court 
included the need for certainty and efficiency in resolving claims by identifying a clearly 
ascertainable date for accrual purposes, to avoid, requiring a claimant to sue prematurely. !d. 
Another important consideration was this Court's recognition that the Highway District 
misrepresented it had an easement over C&G's property: 
Furthermore, the Highway District's erroneous belief it had an easement over the 
section line caused the confusion in this case. It would be bad precedent for this 
Court to condone the government's misrepresentation, albeit innocently mistaken, 
by holding otherwise. The project completion rule promotes judicial economy 
and certainty, which benefits all parties involved in a takings case. 
!d. at 144 (underlining added). 
In this case, while Greystone's claims are timely under the Tibbs-McCuskey standard, the 
facts of this case also provide the same compelling policy reasons for the application of a date-
certain standard similar to C&G. When the government takes or obtains the rights and title in 
real property through conveyance of a deed pursuant to an unconstitutional and illegal fee, the 
date of conveyance is the appropriate standard for when the taking occurs and a claim accrues 
because it provides certainty and efficiency in resolving claims by providing a clearly 
ascertainable date that triggers the claim. It also prevents premature legal action. 
Policy reasons based on the facts of this case also dictate a departure from the Tibbs 
standard. Similar to the county's belief in C&G that it could rightfully construct over the 
landowner's property, the City of McCall thought it could legally require developers to pay a 
community housing fees. Greystone certainly had no reason to question the City's action at that 
point either. See State v. Clark, 88 Idaho 365, 377, 399 P.2d 955, 962 (1965) (ordinances are 
presumed valid and constitutional). Later, it was proven that McCall's Ordinance Nos. 819 and 
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820 were illegal. For the same reasons as C&G the date definite standard should be applied in 
this case. 
IV. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's conveyance of nine building 
lots to McCall was voluntary as a matter of law? 
In granting Summary Judgment, the district court determined that Greystone's 
conveyance of nine lots to the City, as a matter of law, was voluntary. R. Vol. II, pp. 367-69. 
Since the district court believed that act was voluntary, it held that there was no taking of 
Greystone's property requiring the payment of just compensation. The district court was 
incorrect because: 
• The court incorrectly attributed statements to Greystone that were in fact 
statements by the City; 
• The court failed to recognize that Ordinance No. 820 required Greystone to pay 
community housing fees and the Development Agreement merely allowed 
Greystone to pay the fees by conveying real property instead of paying money; 
• The court failed to address Greystone's affidavits submitted that establish genuine 
issues of material fact; 
• The court failed to consider the internal memorandum from the City Planner to 
Staff, which establishes genuine issues of material fact; and 
• The court improperly applied KMST, LLC v. County of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 
P.3d 56 (2003) to the facts in this case. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when all of the evidence establishes that there are 
no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Willie v. Board a/Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133, 59 P.3d 302, 305 (2002). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact rests at all times with 
the party moving for summary judgment. Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-897, 155 P.3d 
695, 697 - 698 (2007). This Court has held that it construes the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's 
favor. Jd. If reasonable persons could reach different conclusions or inferences from the 
evidence, then the motion must be denied. Jd. The nonmoving party however must submit more 
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than just conclusory assertions that an Issue of material fact exists to withstand summary 
judgment. Id. 
Attributing Incorrect Statements To Greystone: 
In this case, the district court erroneously attributed statements to Greystone that it did 
not make. Specifically, to support its conclusion that Greystone voluntarily conveyed the lots to 
the City, the district court held: 
[ c ]ertainly the Plaintiffs, from the record, submitted the idea of the conveyance of 
these lots for community housing. . . . As pointed out in the application, there is 
specific language 'while the applicant is not required to provide a Community 
Housing Plan, the applicant has agreed to deed the nine single family residential 
lots that constitute Phase 3 of the project to the City of McCall to provide 
community housing. 
SeeR. Vol. II, pp. 968-69. 
The district court misread and misapplied the evidence presented on summary judgment. 
This language quoted by the district court to conclude that Greystone acted voluntarily is not in 
Greystone's application. Rather, the quoted language is Finding of Fact No. 16 found in the 
April 27, 2006, McCall City Council Planning and Zoning Commission Findings and Conclusion 
Regarding Application for Final Plat Approval. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. Q. The district court's 
entire conclusion is based on a statement by the City, not Greystone. This is a self-serving 
statement made by the City's Planning and Zoning Commission; it cannot be attributed to 
Greystone. 
Failing To Consider Application of Ordinance No. 820: 
The district court also erred in holding that since Ordinance 819 had not been enacted at 
the time Greystone submitted its application, it somehow meant that Greystone's conveyance of 
the lots was voluntarily made. The district court held: 
From the totality of the record before the Court, the dedication of these lots was a 
voluntary action on the part of the Plaintiffs. No ordinances were in effect at the time 
of the Development Agreement that compelled the Plaintiffs to convey these lots. 
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Certainly the Plaintiffs, from the record, submitted the idea of the conveyance of 
these lots for community housing to the City. Ordinance No. 819 did not apply to the 
Plaintiffs because it had not been enacted until after they had filed for their SUB 
application. 
R. Vol. II, p. 368. The district court leaps to this incredible conclusion without any citation to 
legal authority. 
Greystone is unaware of any reported case to support the district court's conclusion that 
the payment of a community housing fee absent an ordinance compelling such payment means 
the payment must have been voluntary. Moreover, Greystone finds no case law holding the non-
existence of an ordinance is a prerequisite for a taking to arise in an inverse condemnation claim. 
See e.g. Noll an v. Cal Coastal Comm 'n, 483 U.S. 825 ( 1987) (Supreme Court held that the 
defendant's requirement that the landowner grant a public easement was considered a taking; the 
case did not involve an ordinance compelling the landowner to grant a public easement). 
Although Ordinance No. 819 had not been enacted by the time of Greystone's 
application, it does not mean that Greystone was not subject to community housing 
requirements. 3 The City still had Ordinance No. 820, which required the payment of a 
community housing fee as a condition for obtaining a building permit. This is where the City 
compelled Greystone to provide for community housing. 
Proof can be found by reviewing Article VII, Section 7.2 of the Development Agreement, 
which states: "[t]he appraised market value of the lots shall provide Greystone Village with an 
offset against community housing fees for the Greystone Village project. The applicant will also 
receive the associated benefits of the community housing contribution in the building permit 
allocation process." Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. R. (underlining added). In other words, the 
Development Agreement merely allowed Greystone to "pre-pay" community housing fees by 
3 Had Ordinance No 819 applied, Greys tone would have had to earmark 20% of its development to affordable 
workforce housing. 
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deeding real property instead of paying money to the City. The language of the Development 
Agreement demonstrates that the parties both understood that Greystone would have to pay 
community housing fees as part of pulling building pennits. In fact, when Greystone pulled 
building permits it did not pay the fee despite Ordinance No. 820, which required payment on all 
building permit applications. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 226, ~ 6, pp. 229-49. Reading all inferences in 
favor of Greystone, the non moving party, the district court should have found that material 
issues of fact existed on the issue ofvoluntariness. 
Affidavits Establish Genuine Issue ofMaterial Fact: 
Four affidavits submitted by Greystone establish genuine issues of material fact on the 
Issue of voluntariness. Greystone submitted affidavits from a former member of the City 
Council present during the relevant times in this lawsuit stating that community housing, in her 
opinion and experience, was not "voluntary," even before enactment of the relevant ordinances 
(SeeR. Vol. II, p. 219, ~~ 2-4). The City Council member also stated that she was aware that 
staff was instructed to exact community housing fees from developers. Id. 
Greystone's engineer submitted an affidavit that stated community housing was not 
addressed in the application and community housing was a necessary component of the project. 
SeeR. Vol. II, pp. 302-03, ~~5-8). The engineer also states that during his meetings with City 
representatives "it was clearly implied that Greystone had to do something to satisfy the City on 
the issue of affordable housing, and that Greystone had to address affordable housing." R. Vol. 
II, p. 302, ~ 6. Likewise, Greystone's accountant submitted an affidavit stating that he did not 
seek a deduction on Greystone's taxes because the lots were not a charitable contribution, but 
were conveyed to pay fees required by the City and thus could not qualify for a tax deductible 
donation. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 223. Finally, Appellant Richard Hehr, testified in his affidavit that 
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he did not convey the lots as a contribution to the City, but that they were conveyed in lieu of 
paying fees to the city for community housing. SeeR. Vol. II, pp. 226-27, ~~ 7-8. 
The four affidavits discussed above, read in a light most favorable to Greystone raises 
genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. Nonetheless, these affidavits are 
not referenced in the district court's Memorandum Decision, nor is there any explanation for 
how or why these affidavits fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of 
voluntariness. Viewed in a light most favorable to Greystone, these facts should be heard by a 
jury, not disposed of on summary judgment. 
McCall's Internal Memorandum: 
As part of its Motion for Reconsideration, Greystone produced an internal memorandum 
prepared by a City Planner to Staff titled "Subject: Advising applicants about voluntary 
affordable housing mitigation payment." R. Vol. III, p. 442. Pursuant to this memorandum, land 
use applicants were required to "offer a form of affordable housing mitigation that is in keeping 
with the spirit and intent of the housing policy and ordinances that has [sic] been adopted by the 
City." !d. If the "offer" was not sufficient to the City, staff was instructed to return the 
application: 
If they propose a means of compensation as mitigation that is clearly insufficient 
we should just return the permit to them with a comment that in our judgment the 
form of consideration does not resolve the effect the construction of the residence 
will have on the City's affordable housing needs. 
!d. This quoted language illustrates the City's coercive conduct to require applicants to pay a 
fee, but yet paint it as a voluntary act on the part of the fee payer. This conduct is confirmed by 
the affidavit of the City Council member who testified that City planning officials instructed 
Staff to exact community housing fees from developers prior to the enactment of Ordinance Nos. 
819 and 820. R. Vol. II, p. 219, ~~ 3-4. 
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Taken together, and considered in a light most favorable to Greystone, the internal 
memorandum and affidavits create genuine issues of material fact as to whether Greystone's 
payment of community housing fees was, in fact, voluntary. As such, this Court should reverse 
the district court's grant of summary judgment. 
Misapplication of KMST: 
The district court also held that Greystone acted voluntarily under KMST, LLC v. County 
of Ada, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003), because Greystone voluntarily donated the nine lots at 
issue. KMST does not compel the result reached by the district court. 
In KMST, the developer, prior to submitting its land use application, met twice with 
ACHD's representative in order to determine what recommendations regarding KMST's 
development the ACHD staff would make. KMST, at 579-580, 67 P.3d at 58-59. The ACHD 
representative informed KMST that "he would recommend that KMST be required to construct a 
street.. .and dedicate that street to the public." KMST, at 580, 67 P.3d at 59. Based on that 
conversation, KMST submitted, along with its application, a statement that it would construct a 
public street and that such street would be the primary access for the development. !d. KMST 
later sued the county, including for a taking of its property related to the public road it built. 
In KMST this Court held that no taking had occurred because ACHD had no final 
authority to approve or reject the property owners' proposed development. KMST, at 582, 67 
P.3d at 61. Moreover, this Court stated, in dicta, that even if ACHD did have final authority to 
approve some aspect of the development, there was no taking because the KMST voluntarily 
included the dedication of the street based on the conversation it had with the ACHD supervisor. 
!d. 
In this case, the factual scenario is distinguishable from KMST v. Ada County where the 
applicant suggested, in its application, that it dedicate a roadway. Greystone's application, 
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unlike KMST's application, did not include any statement about community housing or 
voluntarily donating community housing. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 302, ~ 5. As discussed above, the 
language the district court attributes to Greystone as part of its application was, in fact, 
statements made by the City. There is no evidence in the record to support the district court's 
finding that Greystone deeded the nine lots voluntarily. Therefore, KMST is inapplicable. 
V. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone failed to exhaust administrative 
remedies? 
The district court also granted summary judgment on grounds that Greystone failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies. This was in error because the district court misapplied the 
exceptions to the exhausting administrative remedies rule. 
As a general rule, a party must exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the 
courts to challenge the validity of administrative acts. Arnzen v. State, 123 Idaho 899, 906, 854 
P .2d 242, 249 (1993). There are two recognized exceptions to this rule: (a) when the interests of 
justice so require, and (b) when the agency acted outside its authority. Regan v. Kootenai 
County, 140 Idaho 721,725, 100 P.3d 615,619 (2004). 
In this case, Greystone's claims meet both exceptions to the general rule of exhaustion. 
First, the City acted outside its authority by requiring the payment of community housing fees. It 
is an adjudicated fact that the City acted outside its authority in requiring the payment of 
community housing fees, and that Ordinance No. 820 was unconstitutional. Groenevelt 
Affidavit, Ex. U. 
Second, the interests of justice exception also compel application of the exhaustion 
exception. As demonstrated by McCall's internal memorandum, the City's policy was that it 
would not process an application unless it provided for what the City considered sufficient 
community housing fees. The interests of justice are best served by requiring the City to return 
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or reimburse Greystone for a fee that the City had no legal authority to collect and that Greystone 
had no obligation to pay. 
The City argued below, and the district court agreed, that under KMST the exceptions to 
the exhaustion requirement only apply to "facial" challenges of ordinances and statutes, and that 
this case is an "as applied" challenge. No Idaho case stands for this proposition. The district 
court, in following the City's lead, relies on the holding in the White v. Bannock County 
Commissioners, 139 Idaho 396, 80 P.3d 332 (2003), for the proposition that the exhaustion 
exceptions only apply to "facial" challenges. SeeR. Vol. II, p. 368. 
White does not include any such holding. The decision does not even use the terms "as 
applied" or "facial," or analyze the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement other than to 
summarily state at the conclusion of the decision that the exceptions did not apply to that 
particular case. Neither White nor any other Idaho case holds that the exhaustion exceptions 
apply only to "facial" challenges. See also American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. 
of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 870-73, 154 P.3d 433,441-43 (2007) (stating that in an "as 
applied" challenge, administrative remedies must first be exhausted for purposes of establishing 
a factual record when the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply, but 
that the traditional exceptions to the general rule apply). 
VI. Did the district court err in holding that Greystone's takings claim based on the U.S. 
Constitution was not ripe and/or was barred under the two year statute of 
limitations? 
The district court erroneously dismissed Greystone's claims based on the federal 
constitution and federal law. In its motion below the City argued, and the district court agreed, 
that the federal law claims were barred because Greystone: (1) was required to bring federal 
claims under Section 1983; (2) its federal claims were unripe pursuant to Williamson County 
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Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); and (3) 
that a two year statute oflimitations applies to Greystone's federal claims. 
A. Greystone was not required to bring its inverse condemnation claim or other 
Federal claims under Section 1983 and is not barred by the two year statute 
of limitations for section 1983 claims. 
Greystone has not sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor was it required to do so to 
maintain an inverse condemnation action for a violation of the Fifth Amendment. In its Motion 
for Summary Judgment below, the City argued that Greystone's federal claims can only be 
brought as a § 1983 claim, which requires application of the two year statute of limitation under 
Idaho Code section 5-219. The United States Supreme Court has established that a party is 
entitled to bring an inverse condemnation action directly under the Fifth Amendment. See First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, Cal. 482 U.S. 304, 
314-315, (1987) (recognizing that "a landowner is entitled to bring an action m mverse 
condemnation as a result of 'the self executing nature ... ' of the Fifth Amendment.) 
In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 175, 108 P.3d 315,322 (2004), 
this Court similarly recognized that a federal inverse condemnation claim may be brought 
directly under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In BHA Investments this Court 
recognized that "[claimants] have asserted their federal claim directly under the Takings Clause 
in the United States Constitution." Id. at 176 n.2, 108 P.3d at 323 n.2. The BHA Investments 
Court also stated that: "The Takings Clause [of the Fifth Amendment] is self-executing, and a 
takings claim may be based solely upon it, First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, or it 
may be brought as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at 
Monterey, Ltd." Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, according both this Court and the U.S. 
Supreme Court Greystone may submit a claim directly under the Fifth Amendment. Since 
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Greystone is not required to proceed under Section 1983, the two year statute of limitation of 
Idaho Code section 5-219 is not applicable to its federal inverse condemnation claim. 
B. This case is distinguishable from Williamson County and the ripeness test is 
inapplicable. 
In granting summary judgment, the district court held that Greystone's Fifth Amendment 
taking claim was not ripe for review under Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. 
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). R. Vol. II, p. 369. Williamson County 
requires that: (1) the governmental entity reach a final decision; and (2) in federal court litigation 
involving regulatory takings, the property owner must "seek compensation through the 
procedures the State has provided for doing so." Williamson County, at 186, 194. Neither of 
these ripeness tests, however, prohibits Greystone's federal takings claims under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
1. Williamson County's first ripeness test is inapplicable in this case. 
In Williamson County, a land owner sued alleging that a county's newly enacted zoning 
ordinance amounted to a taking of his property because the new zoning ordinance reduced the 
density of buildable units in the project. Williamson County, 105 U.S. at 175-82. Under the 
applicable land use and subdivision ordinances, the landowner could have sought a variance 
from the county's zoning ordinance density reduction, but instead sued for a taking of property. 
Jd. This proved fatal for the land owner's claim because the Williamson County Court held that 
the takings claim was not ripe because the landowner failed to first obtain a final decision from 
the county regarding the application the zoning ordinance and subdivision regulations to the 
property. Jd. at 186. The Williamson County Court held that the landowner's claim was not ripe 
because the landowner could have sought a variance to have more buildable lots than what the 
county's zoning ordinance allowed. ld., at 191. 
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In this case, the first ripeness test of Williamson County is inapplicable for two reasons. 
First, the City has already physically taken Greystone's property by receiving deed to the nine 
lots at issue. The "first Williamson County requirement is automatically satisfied at the time of 
the physical taking." Daniel v. County of Santa Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002); see 
also Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1281 n. 28 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that 
"[ w ]here there has been a physical invasion, the taking occurs at once, and nothing the city can 
do or say after that point will change that fact.") (overruled on other grounds by Yee v. City of 
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)). 
Second, there was no variance for Greystone to seek. Nothing under Idaho law or 
McCall's ordinances allow for a variance from paying a community housing fee. Unlike the law 
applicable to the landowner in Williamson County where state and local law provided for a 
variance as a potential remedy, no such variance or waiver existed for Greystone. The record in 
this case is undisputed that if an applicant objected to the payment of community housing fees, 
or the offer was not sufficient, McCall's policy was to return the application. R. Vol. III, p. 442. 
2. Williamson County's Second Ripeness Test is Inapplicable in this 
Case. 
The district court likewise ruled that Greys tone's failed to meet the second part of the 
Williamson County ripeness test because Greystone did not first seek judicial review of the 
City's actions. This misinterprets Williamson County's second ripeness test. The second prong 
of the Williamson County ripeness test requires that a property owner first seek just 
compensation through a state inverse condemnation, and be denied, before litigating in federal 
court. Williamson County, at 194. The second ripeness test is not an exhaustion doctrine or 
exhaustion requirement. The Plaintiffs have filed this action before this state court seeking 
among other things, inverse condemnation. Thus, the second Williamson County ripeness test is 
inapplicable in this case. 
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VII. When is the deadline to file notice of a tort claim triggered under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act when a city passes a resolution creating a right to a refund of fees? 
The district court dismissed Greystone's state-based claims because Greystone failed to 
timely provide notice to the City under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"). R. Vol. II, p. 363. 
The district court erred in dismissing Greystone's state-based claims on this basis because it 
failed to consider that the City's passage of Resolution 08-11 created a new claim against the 
City. 
Tort claims against a political subdivision must be presented within 180 days from the 
date the claim arose. I.C. § 6-906. Presenting the claim within that time frame is a condition 
precedent to an action against a public subdivision. I.C. § 6-908. The ITCA's notice 
requirements apply to claims against a city. I.C. § 50-219; Magnusen Prop. P'ship v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 169, 59 P.3d 971, 974 (2002). 
In this case, Greystone does not dispute more than 180 days have passed since Greystone 
originally conveyed the nine lots and paid the costs to construct roadway improvements to the 
nine lots. The City, however, created a new claim by passing Resolution 08-11 on April 24, 
2008, after its Ordinance No. 820 was found illegal. Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. W. Resolution 
08-11 provided for a refund of Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 820 and 
Resolution 09-10, enacted on November 4, 2009, extended the period to obtain a refund of 
Community Housing fees collected under Ordinance No. 820 until December 31, 2009. 
Groenevelt Affidavit, Ex. X. 
Greystone filed a Refund Request Form on November 12, 2009. Groenevelt Affidavit, 
Ex. Y. The form was provided by the City and the information provided by Greystone, in all 
material respects, complied with the contents required in a notice of tort claim under the ITCA. 
See I.C. § 6-907. The evidence in the record establishes that Greystone provided notice such that 
its state-based claims should not have been dismissed by the district court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Greystone respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
district court's decisions in its June 16, 2011, Memorandum Decision and its October 18, 2011, 
Memorandum Decision granting the City summary judgment, and remand this case to the district 
court for a trial on the merits of Greystone' s claims against McCall. 
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